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CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION TO SERVICE IN THE
SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE FORCE AS A GROUND




The United Nations recognizes "the right of all persons to
refuse service in the military or police forces which are used to
enforce apartheid" and "[c]alls upon Member States to grant
asylum" to conscientious objectors.' The United States voted in
favor of the General Assembly resolution recognizing this right.
2
Nevertheless, the State Department, which advises the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS) on all asylum applica-
tions,3 currently opines that refusal to serve in the South African
Defence Force (SADF) does not satisfy the statutory criteria for
political asylum in the United States.4 This Article will argue
that the State Department opinion runs counter to United
States law and international law.
* J.D. Columbia University 1987, B.S. University of Witwatersrand.
1. United Nations, General Assembly, "Status of Persons Refusing Service in Mili-
tary or Police Forces Used to Enforce Apartheid," Resolution 165 (XXXIII), 20 Dec.
1978, in General Assembly, Official Records, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 45
(A/33/45), 154. G.A. Res. 33/165 also calls upon member states to grant conscientious
objectors "all the rights and benefits accorded to refugees under existing legal instru-
ments. . . " Id.
2. Third Committee of the General Assembly, Press Release GA/SHC/2249 of Dec.
12, 1978, at 27(presenting the Committee discussions on G.A. Res. 33/165)(copy on file at
N.Y.L.S. HUM. RTs. ANN.).
3. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(1987).
4. In re W., (A27140064), Advisory Opinion Letter from Leon M. Johnson, Depart-
ment of State, to David N. Ilchert, District Director of INS, San Francisco, at 5 (Mar. 25,
1985)(copy on file at N.Y.L.S. HUM. RTs. ANN.); In re C.,(A26177723), Advisory Opinion
Letter from Leon M. Johnson, Department of State, to S.I.E., Nonimmigrant Unit,
Travel Control Branch, INS New York, at 5 (Feb. 22, 1985)(On the strength of this let-
ter, INS New York denied asylum and withdrew permission to work. The applicant, fac-
ing the prospect of administrative and judicial appeals without a source of income, left
the United States.)(author's personal files).
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I. ASYLUM STANDARDS
In joining the consensus on U.N. Resolution 33/165, the
U.S. delegate stated his understanding that any decision as to
the granting of asylum would be made in accordance with the
standards of each nation." To qualify for political asylum in the
United States an applicant must show "persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of. . .political opinion"
in the country of origin.' The refusal to obey laws making mili-
tary service compulsory in foreign countries is "generally not
considered sufficient grounds for asylee status."'7 The State De-
partment has confirmed this general policy in the context of
South African draft resisters. Many countries, including the
United States, have laws governing military registration and in-
duction and "[tihe fact that someone breaks the law in his coun-
try and would be imprisoned for that illegal act does not consti-
tute a well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of
the Refugee Act and the United Nations Convention and Proto-
col relating to the status of refugees." 8 For "prosecution to be
tantamount to persecution . . . the punishment must be dispro-
portionate to the crime,"' and the penalty for draft evasion in
South Africa is not "disproportionately severe"' 0 when com-
pared with penalties for draft evasion in the U.S. prior to the
existence of the "volunteer army."
A. The Refugee Act of 1980
The 1980 amendment" to the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 19522 changed the definition of a refugee'" to remove ide-
5. Third Committee of the General Assembly, Dec. 12, 1978, discussions on Resolu-
tion 33/165, supra note 2, at 27.
6. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)(1982), quoted in note 13, infra.
7. A. HELTON, MANUAL ON REPRESENTING ASYLUM APPLICANTS 8 (1984)(footnote
omitted).
8. U.S. Gives Political Asylum to White Foe of Apartheid, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26,
1983, at A3, col. 1 (quoting State Department spokesperson, Paula Kuzmich).
9. In re W., supra note 4, at 4-5.
10 Id. at 2.
11. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1982).
13. See 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(42)(A)(1982) ("The term 'refugee' means ... any person
... who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of [his or her country of nationality or, if stateless, country of
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ological bias from immigration law 4 and to conform with the
language of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees. The courts have not yet settled the question of
whether the 1980 amendment wrought substantive changes in
the asylum standard,6 and it is claimed that "foreign and do-
mestic policy considerations . . . continue to dominate asylum
decision making"' 7 in spite of the 1980 amendment.
Ideological neutrality would be a mixed blessing for South
African draft resisters. If it is improper for denial of asylum to
be based solely on South Africa's pro-Western anti-communist
foreign policy, it is equally improper for a grant of asylum to be
based solely on South Africa's abhorrent ideology of apartheid.
United States foreign policy should not dictate broad presump-
tions of eligibility for asylum."'
B. The Effect of the Protocol
Although the substantive effect of the 1980 Act may be un-
certain, it is settled that Congress intended to conform the Im-
migration and Nationality Act with the language of the United
Nations Protocol."' The Protocol contains the general definition
of refugee status arrived at by the Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees.20 The U.S. acceded to the Protocol in 1968.21
habitual residence] because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion. ... )
14. Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise,
17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 243, 251 (1984)(citing testimony in Congressional hearings).
15. Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1982). The United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (entered into force with respect to the United States Nov. 1, 1968), is
binding on the United States under international law.
16. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 55 U.S.L.W. 4313(Mar. 9, 1987); INS v. Stevic,
467 U.S. 407 (1984); Rejaie, 691 F.2d at 139; Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562 (9th
Cir. 1984).
17. Helton, supra note 14, at 243.
18. Justice Department draft procedure establishing a presumption that aliens fleeing
"totalitarian" countries have a well-founded fear of persecution, also appears to violate
at least the spirit of the 1980 Act. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
19. Rejaie, 691 F.2d at 144.
20. OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCE-
DURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1967 CONVENTION AND
THE PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, 34 (1979) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]
("any person who. . . owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
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It is generally acknowledged that the United Nations High Com-
mission Handbook, which is based on the Protocol, is a "signifi-
cant source of guidance 22 in U.S. immigration law. The State
Department, in assessing the merits of South African draft resis-
tance cases, purports to use the standard of a "well-founded fear
of persecution within the meaning of the Refugee Act and the
United Nations Protocol relating to the status of refugees."2
In opinion letters from the State Department to INS re-
garding specific asylum applications by South African draft re-
sisters, the State Department uses the Handbook to assess
claims of potential persecution. The Handbook states that "a
refugee is a victim - or potential victim - of injustice, not a
fugitive from justice 24 but that "excessive punishment [for a
common law offense] . . . may in itself amount to persecu-
tion. 2 5 The State Department renders this as "the basic princi-
ple that, for prosecution to be tantamount to persecution . . .
the punishment must be disproportionate to the crime."2 After
comparing the effective SADF service commitment of four years
with the sentence of six years for refusal to serve, the State De-
partment concludes that the ratio of 4:6 years is in fact less se-
vere than the equivalent ratio of 2:5 years in the U.S. prior to
the existence of the "volunteer army" and is therefore not dis-
proportionately severe.2 7 The Handbook sanctions this mode of
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."). Cf. 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)(A)(1982) quoted supra note 13.
21. 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577.
22. Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 567 n. 7 (9th Cir. 1984).
23. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1983 at A3, col. 1.
24. HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 56.
25. Id. at 57.
26. In re W., supra note 4, at 4.
27. Id., supra note 4, at 2. Section 16 of the South African Defence Amendment Act
No. 34 of 1983, 10 Stat. S. Afr. 539 (1984), which amended section 126A of Act 44 of
1957, sets the maximum sentence for failure to serve in the SADF at one-and-a-half
times the total period of service to be rendered. Under 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a), U.S.
draft resisters may be imprisoned for up to five years. When the compulsory period of
military service in the U.S. was two years, prior to the advent of the volunteer army, this




analysis by providing that the inherent difficulty of evaluating
the laws of another country may be overcome by each country
using its own legislation as a yardstick2 8 However, the Hand-
book immediately adds a second criterion: "Moreover, recourse
may usefully be had to the principles set out in the various in-
ternational instruments relating to human rights, in particular
the International Covenants on Human Rights. ' 29 The State De-
partment policy makes no apparent attempt to assess South Af-
rican conscription law in terms of international human rights.
II. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
If the State Department policy culminates in the issuance of
final deportation orders to South African draft resisters, the fed-
eral courts may be petitioned to intercede.3 0 Administrative dis-
cretion is broad in the determination of asylum eligibility,' but
the factual basis of the denial is not really the issue here. The
real issue is a question of law and procedural fairness and the
federal courts may review these matters directly.32
The stated grounds for an administrative order must be
grounds "upon which [agency] action can be sustained."'" INS is
subject to the Administrative Procedure Act 4 and must consider
all relevant factors when making administrative determina-
tions." The Handbook provides a unique source of relevant fac-
tors in asylum determinations.'
Selective application of these factors may even rise to the
level of a constitutional violation if factors supporting the order
are cited while factors undermining the order are simply ig-
nored. Aliens in asylum proceedings are covered by fifth amend-
28. HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 160.
29. Id.
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(1982).
31. See Wong Wing Hang v. INS, 360 F. 2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1966).
32. Chlomos v. Department of Justice, 516 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1975); Hirsch v. INS,
308 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1962).
33. SEC v. Chenery Corp. 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943).
34. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950)(Deportation cases must con-
form to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
829.
35. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); Home
Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
36. Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 567 n.7 (9th Cir. 1984).
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ment due process protection37 and self-serving selective applica-
tion of relevant factors does not conform with the "traditional
standards of fairness '"38 required by the due process clause. 9
The appropriate remedy would be a remand with instruc-
tions to the State Department and INS to apply the Handbook
criteria in an objective and non-selective fashion. Three re-
sponses are possible: both factors may be applied and the initial
determination confirmed; both factors may be applied and the
initial determination reversed; or the agencies may decide not to
apply the Handbook factors at all. This remedy is appropriate
because it goes to process and not necessarily to substantive out-
come. This enables the courts to correct procedural deficiencies
without undue interference with agency discretion.
37. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903)(deportation context). The cir-
cuits differ on whether the 1980 Refugee Act created a liberty interest within the protec-
tion of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The fifth circuit recognizes "a
constitutionally protected right to petition our government for political asylum." Haitian
Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1038 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). The second circuit
recognizes a similar right. Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 37(2d Cir. 1984); Yiu Sing Chun
v. Sava, 708 F.2d 869,877(2d Cir. 1983). However, the eleventh circuit holds that the
1980 Refugee Act creates a right protected by express statutory provisions and not by
constitutional guarantees. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 981-82(11th Cir. 1984), aff'd.
without deciding the constitutional issue, at 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
38. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953). The extent of process afforded
applicants who are already technically within the U.S. and thus subject to deportation,
as opposed to exclusion, is greater than that afforded applicants who seek asylum at a
port of entry and are thus subject to exclusion. Id. at 210-12. However, the 1980 Act does
not distinguish between asylum applicants present in the U.S. and those seeking entry:
"The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically present in the
United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such alien's status, to
apply for asylum. ... 8 U.S.C.§ 1158(a)(1982)(emphasis added). It could thus be ar-
gued that due process protection must be afforded asylum applicants regardless of
whether they are already present in the U.S. or are merely seeking entry. See, eg., S. REP.
No. 256, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 4(1979).
39. The extent of procedural protections afforded statutory benefits such as political
asylum is determined by a tripartite test which considers the private interest affected by
the official action, the risk of error and the value of additional safeguards, and the gov-
ernment interest involved. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). In political
asylum cases the private interest in remaining in the United States and the risks of
erroneous denial are often substantial. The government has no legitimate interest in
manipulating the HANDBOOK factor analysis and a good faith application of the factors
imposes no additional fiscal or administrative burden. See generally, Note, The Right to
Appointed Counsel in Asylum Proceedings, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1157, 1179-84(1985) (writ-
ten by Elizabeth Glazer)(discussing the Mathews test in the context of due process and
the right to appointed counsel). Under the Mathews criteria the asylum applicant should
be protected from selective application of the HANDBOOK factors.
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III. AGENCY RESPONSE ON REMAND
One response by the agencies to the court-ordered remand
may be a refusal to apply the Handbook factors at all. This re-
fusal may in turn be challenged in federal court as a refusal to
consider "a significant source of guidance, 40 and a failure to
consider an "important aspect"" of an asylum claim. If the
agencies respond to remand by considering both factors, the out-
come may be the same or different as administrative discretion
is preserved. However, once both factors are taken into consider-
ation, the applicant's prospects are arguably far brighter.
A. The Human Rights Factor
Even if the human rights factor as described in the Hand-
book is included in the State Department analysis, it is not clear
that the basic finding will be different. The right of a country to
defend itself is fundamental and in no way inconsistent with in-
ternational human rights. At least on the face of it, the South
African Defence Act does no more than "defen[d] the Republic"
from internal and external threats. 2 Apartheid, the key tenet of
that Republic, has been condemned as a "crime against the con-
science and dignity of mankind,"' 3 but the U.S. has consistently
failed to join the majority of U.N. members in supporting such
sweeping resolutions. It may also be contended that defense of
the Republic and propagation of apartheid are entirely separate
and that the former offends no principle of human rights. In
fact, apartheid and the SADF are inextricably bound.
The SADF is statutorily authorized to engage in "defence of
the Republic,"" "prevention or suppression of terrorism"' 5 and,
40. Zavala-Bonilla, 730 F.2d 562, 567 n.7 (9th Cir. 1984); see supra notes 33-36 and
accompanying text.
41. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual, 463 U.S. 29, 43(1982)(failure
to consider an "important aspect" of an administrative determination is arbitrary and
capricious).
42. South African Defence Act No. 1 of 1976, 10 Stat. S. Afr. 621 (1984) (amending
Defence Act No. 44 of 1957, § 3(2)(a), 10 Stat. S. Afr. 455-610 (1984)) [hereinafter De-
fence Act].
43. Report of the World Conference for Action againstApartheid, Lagos, Nigeria 22-
26, Aug. 1977(United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.XIV.2 and Corr.), § X [herein-
after Lagos Declaration].
44. Defence Act, supra note 42, § 3(2)(a).
45. Id. at § 3(2)(aA).
1986]
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
among other things, in "the prevention or suppression of inter-
nal disorder."' 6 The authorization to suppress "terrorism" allows
the SADF to enforce the draconian Internal Security Act with
its sweeping definition of "terrorism." '47 The intent element of
"terrorism" is defined to include "bring[ing] about or
promot[ing] any constitutional, political, industrial, social or ec-
onomic aim or change in the Republic. '48 Any violent act with
such intent amounts to treason, while almost any non-violent act
with such intent may constitute subversion. Thus a broad spec-
trum of political activity, "in the Republic or elsewhere, 4 9 may
result in detention and prosecution, or "suppression" by the
SADF. The broad powers of the SADF are roughly separable
into internal and external components.
1. Internal Role of the SADF
In 1977, the Minister of Defence outlined "military strat-
egy" with respect to "national political policy.'' 50 The corner-
stone of this policy was the "independent development of all
population groups."8" Thus, the maintenance of apartheid was
explicitly made part of the SADF mandate. In 1983, the South
African Constitution made provision for Coloured and Indian
representation in Parliament.52 The South African government
has used such reform measures to proclaim the demise of
apartheid. Although apartheid may no longer be the favored
term for South Africa's elaborate system of racial segregation, it
is clear that the basic principles remain entrenched. The major-
ity black population is conspicuously excluded from the new
multiracial Parliament. Even within the new Parliament, the
Houses are racially segregated and the white House of Assembly
has more voting power than the Coloured and Indian Houses
combined." In all fundamental respects, the system of apartheid
46. Id. at § 3(2)(b).
47. South African Internal Security Act, No. 74 of 1982, § 54, 8 Stat. S. Afr. 1291,
1359 (1984).
48. Id. (emphasis added by author).
49. Id. at § 54(2)(i), 8 Stat. S. Afr. 1361 (1984).
50. White Paper on Defence 1977, 22 at 8 (emphasis in the original)(copy on file at
N.Y.L.S. HUM. RTS. ANN.).
51. Id.
52. Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983, 7 Stat. S. Afr. xx (198x).
53. Id. at §§ 37,52; see generally Rudolph, Constitutional Law, ANNUAL SURVEY OF
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is still very much in force and the SADF is becoming an increas-
ingly important factor in its maintenance.
SADF troops occupying black areas in an attempt to quell
widespread dissent in 1985 were responsible for numerous inju-
ries and many deaths. According to figures released in the House
of Assembly by the Minister of Defence, the SADF was
resposible for deaths in Kathlehong, Langa, Despatch and
Dudunza 4 Under the State of Emergency declared on July 21,
1985, the broad powers of the SADF were further augmented.
Non-commissioned officers of the SADF are given broad discre-
tionary powers for the "maintenance of public order ' 55 and any
member of the SADF is given authority to arrest or detain any
person 56 or search any vehicle or place,5 if in his opinion this is
necessary for the maintenance of public order. Under the regula-
tions governing the State of Emergency, "any act in good faith"
for the maintenance of public order is fully indemnified" and no
civil or criminal proceedings may be brought against the author-
ities. This may be interpreted as a license to the security forces
to restore order at any cost. A 1986 report by Lawyers Commit-
tee for Human Rights alleges widespread beatings, shootings,
whippings and arrests and torture of children by the security
forces. Although South African officials reject the charges, spe-
cific detailed allegations have been made of SADF involvement
in these activities.5 9
Although the South African Police retain primary responsi-
bility for the suppression of internal dissent, the role of the
SADF has become increasingly important in recent years.
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 1-9 (1983).
54. The [Johannesburg] Star, June 24, 1985 at 7, col. 1 (international edition). See
also, Army Playing Major Role in Riot Townships, The [Johannesburg] Star, April 15,
1985 at 1, col. 1(international edition)(briefly describing SADF activities in New Brigh-
ton, Zwide, kwaZakhele, and kwaNobuhle townships); Mob at Uitenhage Sets Young
Mechanic on Fire, April 22, 1985 at 1, col. 1(international edition)(mentioning that a
"Defence Force unit fired on a crowd of rioters" in the Eastern Cape, as well as the death
of a 22-year-old man in an incident involving the SADF in Langa).
55. Proclamation No. 9877, July 21, 1985, Schedule II, §§ 1(ii), 2.
56. Id. at § 3.
57. Id. at § 5.
58. Id. at § 11.
59. U.S. Group Charges Wide Beating of Children by South African Police, N.Y.
Times, April 18, 1986, at A4, col. 4.
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2. The external Role of the SADF
The most enduring manifestation of the external role of the
SADF has become its 66-year presence in Namibia. Originally
legitimate under a League of Nations Mandate, this presence
was meant to prepare the territory for eventual self-determina-
tion.' In violation of the Mandate, South Africa repeatedly
sought to annex and incorporate Namibia and refused to facili-
tate full independence through a Trusteeship agreement after
the establishment of the United Nations.'
In 1969, the United Nations Security Council first declared
this presence to be an illegal occupation. 2 Two years later, the
International Court of Justice confirmed this determination,"
and in 1976 a Security Council Resolution was passed, with
United States support, demanding that South Africa end its ille-
gal occupation." A declaration on Namibia, expressing "grave[]
concern[] at the threat to international peace and security posed
by the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by South Af-
rica," was adopted by the General Assembly on May 3, 1978.6
South Africa's illegal presence in Namibia has led to further
violations of international law. Atrocities by SADF personnel di-
rected at the civilian population in northern Ovamboland were
allegedly intended to stamp out support for the SWAPO guerilla
insurgency.6 Although such accounts are practically impossible
to verify, details match in many independent accounts. Namibia
is frequently used as a staging point for massive invasions of An-
gola. Ostensibly "hot pursuit" or preemptive operations have in-
60. J.H.P. SERFONTEIN, NAMIBIA 21 (1976).
61. LONDON INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE & AID FUND, NAMIBIA: THE FACTS 11 (1980).
62. S.C. Res. 264, 24 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council
1-2, UN. Doc. S/INF/24/Rev. 1 (1969).
63. Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding S.C. Res. 276 (1970),
1971 I.C.J. 16.
64. S.C. Res. 385, 31 U.N. SCOR, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council
8-9, U.N. Doc. S/INF/32 (1976).
65. "Declaration on Namibia and Programme of Action in Support of Self-Determi-
nation and National Independence for Namibia", adopted by the General Assembly,
May 3, 1978 at the Ninth Special Session on the Question of Namibia (copy on file at
N.Y.L.S. HUM. RTS. ANN.).
66. "Letter dated July 24, 1979 from the President of the U.N. Council for Namibia
to the Secretary-General," U.N. Doc. A/34/382, S/13469 (1979); U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1982, 297-98 (1983).
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volved such diverse targets as the Kassinga refugee camp in 1978
and the Gulf Oil depot at Cabinda in 1985.67 Over 200 people
were killed in a 1982 raid alone.6 Angola has not been singled
out for SADF invasion. Since 1980, Swaziland, Mozambique,
Zimbabwe, Botswana and Lesotho have also been subjected to
SADF raids. In these instances, preempting the ANC guerilla in-
surgency is generally cited as justification. International law un-
doubtedly affords nations the right to defend themselves against
external aggression. 9
In the era of guerilla warfare, self-defense is frequently in-
voked to justify preemptive strikes on foreign soil. The United
States used this rationale to justify the 1986 air-strike on Libya
although Libya posed no direct threat to United States territory
and only an indirect threat to U.S. citizens travelling abroad.7
Thus it might be argued that raids by the SADF on neighboring
territories do not violate international law. However, the clear
disapproval of the international community is shown by the lit-
any of condemnatory United Nations resolutions. The U.S. has
likewise condemned these actions, although frequently ab-
staining from U.N. resolutions. After the 1985 Cabinda raid into
Angola and a raid on Botswana which took twelve lives, the U.S.
recalled Ambassador Herman Nickel "for consultations.17 This
was widely interpreted as a strong gesture of condemnation in
the context of the Reagan Administration policy of "constructive
engagement" with the South African government. Although
some of the SADF's external operations are arguably justified
under international law, the overall role of the SADF has pro-
voked the argument that South Africa, per se, constitutes a
threat to international peace.7
After high-school student protests were forcefully sup-
pressed in Soweto and other black areas in 1976, the World Con-
ference for Action Against Apartheid described apartheid as a
67. Commando Says Target Was Angola Oil Depot, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1985, at
A2, col. 3; Captured Commando Speaks Out, The [Johannesburg] Star, June 3, 1985, at
1, col. 1(international edition).
68. South Africans Kill 201 in Angola Raid, N.Y. Times, March 17, 1982, at A3, col.
4.
69. The extent of this right is controversial and beyond the scope of this article.
70. N.Y. Times, April 15, 1986' at Al, col. 2.
71. N.Y. Times, June 15, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
72. Johnson, Sanctions and South Africa, 19 HARV. INT'L L. J. 887 (1978).
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"flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and "a crime against
the conscience and dignity of mankind. ' 73 In recognition of the
role of the SADF in propagating the system of apartheid, the
Conference urged the immediate granting of "political asylum to
bona fide war resisters and deserters from the apartheid armed
forces."7' This recommendation led in 1978, to the passage of
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 33/165 which "[r]ecognizes
the right of all persons to refuse service in the military or police
forces which are used to enforce apartheid" and "[clalls upon
Member States to grant asylum" to such resisters .1  The United
States voted in favor of this resolution.7 6
Official U.S. policy statements spanning seven administra-
tions have conceded the link between the SADF and human
rights abuses of the apartheid system. Since 1963, the U.S. has
voluntarily refused to sell materials to South Africa which might
enhance its military capabilities.7 Even under the Reagan Ad-
ministration's constructive engagement policy, this longstanding
policy remains in effect.7 In 1985, President Reagan "declared a
national emergency to deal with the threat posed by the policies
and actions of the Government of South Africa to the foreign
policy and economy of the United States ' 79 and applied addi-
tional military and economic sanctions by Executive Order.80
This consistent pattern linking the SADF to the human rights
abuses of apartheid would make it difficult for the State Depart-
ment to separate SADF activities from propagation of apartheid
73. Lagos Declaration, supra note 43.
74. Id.
75. G.A.Res. 33/165, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
76. Third Committee of the General Assembly, Dec. 12, 1978, supra note 2, at 27.
77. In a statement to the Security Council on August 2, 1963, United States Repre-
sentative Adlai E. Stevenson announced that the United States "expect[ed] to bring to
an end the sale of all military equipment to the Government of South Africa by the end
of thie] calendar year." Statement by Mr. Stevenson, 49 Dep't St. Bull. 333, 335(1963).
Five days later the United States voted for a Security Council resolution calling upon
"all States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types
and military vehicles to South Africa." S.C. Res. 181, 18 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/5386
(1963).
78. N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1981; N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1981.
79. President's Message to Congress Concerning Economic Sanctions Against South
Africa, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1262 (Sept. 25, 1986).
80. Exec. Ord. No. 12,532, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,861 (1985).
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in the context of the human rights factor.
B. The Excessive Punishment Factor
The State Department application of the Handbook's exces-
sive punishment factor is also subject to challenge. The Hand-
book uses the term "common law offence ' '81 in connection with
the "excessive punishment" rule."s The State Department
equates "common law offense" with "crime""s but the terms are
not necessarily interchangeable. "Crime" in a narrow sense may
mean only the contravention of a statute describing undesireable
behavior. The term "common law offense" incorporates tradi-
tional notions of wrongfulness.84
Refusal to serve in the SADF violates the clear language of
the South African Defence Act. Under a narrow view this is a
crime regardless of the reason for refusal. Treason is a "common
law offense" with a long pedigree"0 and refusal to defend one's
country may be construed as treasonous. However, if the specific
culpability of refusal to serve in the SADF is taken into consid-
eration, an argument can be made for finding no common law
offense at all.
Questions of culpability are essentially questions of moral-
ity." The theory of natural law purported to operate in this
sphere of absolute morality. 7 No theory of absolute moral law is
necessary to apply normative considerations in this case. Inter-
national law certainly comes closer to the moral ideal than the
positive law of South Africa, and international law has been very
clear on the role of the SADF. In fact, international law views
81. HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 57.
82. Id.
83. In re W., supra note 4, at 4.
84. See generally G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, xix-xxiii (1978).
85. When a Man doth compass, or imagine the Death of our Lord the King...
or if a Man do Levy War against our Lord the King in his Realm, or be adherent
to the King's Enemies in his Realm, giving to them Aid and Comfort, in the
Realm, or elsewhere .... [tihat ought to be adjudged Treason.
Statute of 25 Edw. 3 (1350); see also Arthur Crohagan's Case, 79 Eng. Rep. 891 (K.B.
1634) (applying 25 Edw. 3).
86. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 78 (1961)(identifying the "primary norms" of
a system of laws).
87. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
HARV. L. REV. 149, 152 (1928/29)("certain principles of right and justice... are entitled
to prevail of their own extrinsic excellence." (emphasis in the original)).
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not refusal to serve in the SADF but apartheid itself as the
crime.9" "Bona fide"" draft resisters, who have sincere political
or moral objections to service in the SADF, thus lack the ele-
ment of culpability essential to a common law offense. Prosecu-
tion on account of such conscientious objection would amount to
persecution "on account of . . . religion . . . or political opin-
ion,"9 establishing eligibility for political asylum.
It must be conceded that this argument is not likely to re-
ceive serious consideration in agency determinations. Even
courts are reluctant to allow testimony on moral justifications
for otherwise illegal acts. In the recent trial of eleven church
workers accused of providing sanctuary to undocumented aliens
from Central America, District Judge Earl Carroll consistently
ruled out defense attempts to testify on religious or humanita-
rian issues or conditions in Central America.91 Courts have occa-
sionally shown a willingness to consider wrongfulness of conduct
as distinct from its criminality," but these instances are admit-
tedly rare.
Moreover, asking the State Department to pass judgment
on the morality of foreign draft laws would run counter to gen-
eral legal and diplomatic precedents. Chao-Ling Wang v. Pil-
liod,e' for example, held that prosecution by a military tribunal
in Formosa of a naval officer for refusal to return to Formosa in
accordance with his orders, does not constitute persecution. A
serving officer may be distinguished from an inductee but the
general rule would probably cover both. As interpreted by INS,
this rule is very broad. INS recently issued an order for the de-
portation of a Nicaraguan conscientious objector despite the fact
that President Reagan has denounced the Sandinista army as a
"brutal Communist aggressor." '
Even if the State Department and INS are not convinced by
88. Lagos Declaration, supra note 43.
89. G. A. Res. 33/165, supra note 1.
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)(1982).
91. Testimony Ended in Trial on Aliens, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1986 at B8, col. 1.
92. U.S. v. Meadows, 598 F.2d 984, 993 (5th Cir. 1979)(Rubin, J., dissenting in part).
93. 285 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1960).
94. Nicaraguan Fights Ouster by U.S., Citing Military Draft in Homeland, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 31, 1986 at A15, col. 5; but cf N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1986 at Al, col. 1, at
A28, col 1(discussing Justice Department draft procedures establishing a presumption
that aliens fleeing "totalitarian" countries have a well-founded fear of persecution).
[Vol. IV
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
the common-law offense rationale, a good-faith application of
both the Handbook factors should result in reversal of current
State Department policy. The powerful human rights considera-
tions must surely outweigh the U.S. domestic law proportional-
ity comparison. If application of both factors does not result in
reversal of State Department policy, we have come full circle -
a federal court is unlikely to set aside this determination. In one
important respect, however, it is a victory. The State Depart-
ment is forced to make explicit findings on the role of the SADF
and its effect on human rights. These findings may then be
tested in the forum of public opinion and in the congressional
arena. The mere prospect of attempting to justify a finding that
the role of the SADF is compatible with international human
rights, may lead to a voluntary reversal of the present policy.
Although exposure to public scrutiny may not appear to be
a very powerful remedy, the unique pariah status of South Af-
rica has considerable force in the realm of political embarrass-
ment. For example, Jeane Kirkpatrick met with the chief of
South African military intelligence while she was U.S. delegate
to the U.N., in spite of the U.S. policy against granting visas to
high-ranking South African military officers. Initially the State
Department denied that the meeting had taken place, but later
claimed that Mrs. Kirkpatrick had been unaware of the affilia-
tion of the South African official. The State Department was
quick to confirm that the policy against granting visas remained
in full force."5 The force of public opposition to apartheid was
demonstrated by the recent sanctions measures enacted against
South Africa. President Reagan vetoed the measure,"0 but for
the first time in his presidency, the veto was overridden by Con-
gress.9 7 A quasi-political remedy of this sort may not be a per-
95. State Dept. Cites 'Omission' in South Africans' Entry, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20,
1981, at A5, col. 1; White House Says Mrs. Kirkpatrick Didn't Know South African's
Role, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1981, A4, col. 3.
96. President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.R. 4868 With*-
out Approval, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1281 (Sept. 26, 1986).
97. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986).
The Act states that Congress finds "the policy of apartheid [to be] abhorrent and mor-
ally repugnant," § 110(a)(1), 100 Stat. 1093, and commits the United States to a policy of
assisting the "victims of apartheid," § 103(b)(3), 100 Stat. 1090, and "aiding individuals
or groups in South Africa whose goals are to. . . foster nonviolent legal or political chal-
lenges to the apartheid laws," § 103(b)(3), 100 Stat. 1090. Although South African draft
resisters do not fall within either of these categories (unless "victims of apartheid" is
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fect remedy, but it is perhaps an appropriate one, given the po-
litical essence of asylum requests.
CONCLUSION
United States immigration law and international law
strongly support the claim of South African draft resisters to po-
litical asylum in the United States. Current State Department
policy does not recognize SADF draft resistance as sufficient
grounds for political asylum. Judicial intervention to force re-
consideration of this administrative determination would show
that the State Department policy is neither legally nor politi-
cally defensible.
construed very broadly), granting political asylum to such resisters is clearly compatible
with the spirit of the Act.
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